THE STATE OF OREGON

                           HEARINGS DIVISION

Oregon Occupational Safety &                                    
     Health Division			)  Docket No:  SH-93232, SH-93231

	Plaintiff,			)


		vs.			)  Citation No:  M0072-075-93,

					)                M0072-062-93


Cascade Heating Spec			)


	Defendant.			)  Opinion and Order

	Hearing convened before Administrative Law Judge Mills in Bend,
Oregon on June 13 through June 15, 1995.  OR-OSHA was
represented by its attorney, Assistant Attorney General Armonica
Gilford, and safety compliance officer, Claudia Marthaller, was
OR-OSHA's representative.  The employer, Cascade Heating &
Specialties, was represented by its attorney, J. C. Van Vorhees,
and its representative was Al Damon.  Wanda Nyquist with
Business Support Services recorded the proceedings.  Exhibits A
through H and 1 through 26 were received into evidence.

	While closing arguments were held on June 15, 1995, the record
was left open to allow OR-OSHA time to provide the employer with
information regarding other willful citations issued in the Bend
area.  That documentation was provided to the employer on August
8, 1995.  By letter dated October 9, 1995, the employer
indicated that it did not intend to present any further
evidence.  It did provide additional argument at that time.  In
a phone call received on November 3, 1995, Ms. Gilford advised
that she would not be responding to the additional argument from
the employer.  Accordingly, the record was closed on that date.


	The employer contests citation number M0072-062-93 issued on
June 4, 1993 arising from an inspection in La Pine, Oregon.  The
citation contains only one item which is a repeat violation for
inadequate fall protection and carries a $6,000 discretionary
penalty.  The employer disputes that the violation occurred,
does not contest the classification as repeat, but does contest
the penalty.

	The employer also contests citation number M0072-075-93 issued
on June 8, 1993 arising from an inspection at Sun River, Oregon,
which is a willful violation for inadequate fall protection
carrying a discretionary penalty of $10,000.  The employer
disputes that the violation occurred, disputes the
classification as willful and disputes the discretionary
penalty.  The employer also argues that inadequate credentials
were provided and that the citation should be dismissed.  


	The two citations at issue in this case arise from two separate
inspections performed by safety compliance officer Claudia
Marthaller.  The first inspection, leading to what will be
referred to as the La Pine citation, took place on March 18,
1993.  The second, which resulted in what will be referred to as
the Sun River citation, took place on April 7, 1993.

	The employer, Cascade Heating & Specialties, Inc., does
residential and commercial roofing.  It started a project at La
Pine Elementary School in November 1992.  The employer had been
cited previously on four occasions for failing to have adequate
fall protection and was, therefore, well aware of the
requirements for fall protection.  The employer had, following
the prior citations, fabricated brackets which could be screwed
or clamped at the roof edge, depending upon the stage of the
construction.  Those brackets would then hold dimensional lumber
that would provide fall protection.  The employer was aware that
the rules required the use of this fall protection when the
ground to eave height exceeded ten feet.

	When the employer started the La Pine project, there was six to
seven feet of snow on the ground.  Since the eave height in the
location at issue in this case was between ten and eleven feet,
there was no need for fall protection initially since one could
essentially walk from the snow level up onto the roof level. 
The employer, however, was aware that the snow would melt and
that fall protection would eventually be necessary. 
Accordingly, the fall protection was on site.  

	On the day that Ms. Marthaller did her inspection, she observed
Cascade Heating employees  on the roof at La Pine working
without fall protection.  She then presented credentials and
began an inspection.  She measured from the eave to the ground
and obtained a measurement of 10 feet six inches.  There was a
little bit of snow remaining on the ground which she went
through to obtain her measurement.  At this point in the
project, there was some snow in some locations on the ground
under the eaves where work was being performed.  However, the
snow was not present in all locations and it was uneven in its
surface where it was located (ex. 10-2).  Unlike the situation
when the project first started, the snow at this point did not
provide a barrier to prevent a fall in excess of ten feet. 
Accordingly, the employer was cited for violating OAR
437-3-040(1) for failing to provide fall protection where
employees were working on a roof with a ground to eave height in
excess of ten feet.

	The violation was classified as a repeat violation.  This was
based upon the following prior citations.  A citation issued on
June 25, 1990 after an inspection on south Highway 97, which
carried a serious violation for a $700 fine.  A citation issued
on March 13, 1992 arising from an inspection at Sisters High
School, which was a $300 repeat violation.  A citation issued on
April 17, 1992 arising from an inspection at the Viewpoint
Plaza, which was rated as a $1,500 repeat violation.  Finally, a
citation was issued on September 17, 1992 arising from an
inspection at Empire Avenue, which resulted in a $4,000 repeat

	This was a fourth repeat violation for failing to have fall
protection under OAR 437-01-165(1) and (2).  The penalty for
such a violation is at the discretion of the administrator of
OR-OSHA and cannot be less than $200 nor more than $70,000.  Ms.
Marthaller recommended a fine of $6,000 (ex. 4-1).  Her
recommendation was initialed by J. P. on May 25, 1993.  The
initials J. P. are the initials of John Pompei, who is the
administrator or OR-OSHA (ex. 17-9).

	The $6,000 penalty was based upon the following factors:  This
was the employer's fifth citation for failing to have fall
protection.  The risk of injury in this situation was not great.
Ms. Marthaller rated the probability of injury as low and the
potential injury as serious, while prior citations had been
assigned low death ratings  The employer felt that the snow on
the ground made the ground to eave height less than ten feet,
but the employer had not been taking more recent measurements to
ensure that that was the case.  

	Following the La Pine inspection, Mr. Damon, one of the owners,
called a company-wide meeting to stress the importance of using
fall protection.  His position to his employees has been that
they had been provided with fall protection equipment, that they
were trained in its use, they had the equipment and training and
should be using the equipment and they should be doing so
whenever there was any question that the equipment should be
used.  It is not clear, however, that the employees of the
employer were getting this message.  

	The employer had an employee handbook in 1993.  It generally
required that safety rules be followed and that safety equipment
be used, but did not specifically mention the use of fall
protection, despite the fact that the employer had been cited
for lacking fall protection on four occasions prior to the
preparation of the handbook.  In 1995, a specific revision
regarding fall protection was added to the handbook.

	Rod Long, who was the roofing manager and who was periodically
on site at La Pine and in charge of that job, had also been in
charge at the time of the Empire Avenue and Sisters High School
inspections and citations.  He had discussions with Mr. Damon
after those citations were issued and felt that he had been
verbally reprimanded.  No other disciplinary action was taken
against Mr. Long or other employees regarding the lack of fall

	The employer had a safety committee which met monthly.  Minutes
from the safety committee meetings during the period from July
through December 1992 reflect that there were concerns raised
about the lack of fall protection and the failure of employees
to want to use fall protection if it was not something they were
comfortable with or if it was too cumbersome.  The minutes do
not reflect any follow-up action taken with respect to these
concerns.  Mr. Damon was not present during the safety committee
meetings as a general rule, although the minutes did cross his

	On April 7, 1993, Ms. Marthaller performed a planned program
inspection at Sun River where the employer was doing roofing on
a new gymnasium.  As Ms. Marthaller arrived at the site, she
observed two workers working on a roof without fall protection. 
As soon as the two men saw her, they scurried around to a
different side of the building.  While Ms. Marthaller waited for
the general contractor to be contacted, she walked around that
side of the building and contacted the two employees who worked
for Cascade Heating & Specialties, Inc.  They were Jeff
Williams, working as a foreman who had been with the employer
for about six months, and Mat Landers, an apprentice.  Ms.
Marthaller presented her credentials to the employees and asked
if they knew the ground to eave height at the area where they
were working.  Mr. Williams became angry and rude and indicated
that he did not know the ground to eave height and did not care,
that he had worked on higher roofs than this and had not been
hurt.  He refused to give any other information other than the
name of his employer.  He did advise Ms. Marthaller that she
ought to get a real job and quit hassling people.

	After this contact, Ms. Marthaller was introduced to the
general contractor, did an opening conference with credentials
and completed her inspection.  The roof ground to eave height
was 10 feet six inches and no fall protection was being used. 
The workers had fall protection in the truck that they brought
to the site, but did not use it.

	Later, during the course of her inspection, Ms. Marthaller
spotted Rod Long on the roof, again without fall protection. 
After he saw her, he went down a ladder back to his truck and
got fall protection equipment which he was then attempting to
set up when she contacted him.  

	A citation was issued on June 8, 1992 citing the employer for
failing to have fall protection.  The violation was classified
as willful and a $10,000 discretionary penalty was assessed (ex.
17).  The violation was classified as willful for a number of
reasons including the following:

	The employer had been cited for the same violation five times
during a three-year period.  The same supervisor, Mr. Long, was
involved in at least four of the violations.  Fall protection
was on site at both La Pine and Sun River, but was not being
used.  Fall protections issues were discussed at safety
committee meetings, but there was no follow-up.  Significant
discipline was not used by management to enforce fall protection
use.  Fall protection was not specifically required in the
employee handbook.  Ms. Marthaller also considered that there
was an injury involving failure to use fall protection, but that
was inaccurate.

	The roofs at both La Pine and Sun River had a 4/12 pitch.  Both
were metal roofs with metal roofing material being placed over
other base material such as sheathing, insulation, flashing and
channels.  These were not built up roofing projects.

Motions to Dismiss

	During the course of this hearing, the employer has made a
number of motions to dismiss which will be dealt with as follows:


	The employer's motion to dismiss alleges that Ms. Marthaller
failed to appropriately present credentials as required by ORS
654.067(1).  I have previously held that that section requires
the appropriate presentation of credentials before an inspector
can perform an inspection and investigation and that failure to
comply with the statute may result in a dismissal of the

	My findings of fact above reflect that Ms. Marthaller did
appropriately present credentials to employer representatives
after coming onto the site at both La Pine and Sun River.  In
both cases, she was on property open to the public and before
having a chance to present credentials saw individuals working
without fall protection on a roof in plain view.  I think it is
clear under basic search and seizure principles that Ms.
Marthaller's observations from a public place of activities
taking place in plain view occurring before she could present
credentials are not somehow tainted by the fact that credentials
were not presented prior to the initial observations that she

	More specifically, the employer argues that the inspection at
Sun River was invalid based upon the reasoning set forth in
OR-OSHA v. Ostlie, 136 Or App 284 (1995).  Ostlie stands for the
proposition that the employer who is cited is entitled to proper
presentation of credentials and that presentation to the owner
of the property is not in and of itself sufficient for purposes
of the statute.  The employer's position is that under that
analysis, since Ms. Marthaller simply wandered about the
premises and came upon a violation which she was not able to
observe in any other way, this was an illegal entry and
inspection contrary to the requirements of ORS 654.067.

	I do not find that argument persuasive for a number of reasons.
First, Ms. Marthaller did not engage in any illegal entry.  She
was in an area open to the public.  Second, she did not come
upon a violation by wandering about the premises.  She saw the
workers working without fall protection while they were in plain
view.  While she was waiting for the general contractor, she did
wander around the corner of the building where she met up with
the two workers who had fled when they saw her.  Again, she was
not engaged in any illegal entry at that point and before
engaging in any further inspection or investigation with respect
to these employees and their employer, she presented her

	If the employer is arguing that Ms. Marthaller had to wait for
the general contractor before she could proceed any further, I
reject that argument.  Neither the statute nor the Ostlie case
suggests such a requirement.  Ms. Marthaller went around the
side of the building to find the employees she had already seen
in plain view working without fall protection.  She was entitled
to do that and then make a presentation of credentials when she
made contact with an employer.  Ostlie stands for the
proposition that it is necessary for the compliance officer to
contact the employer who is the subject of the inspection and
who is interested in the inspection in order to present
credentials.  It is not sufficient under Ostlie to present
credentials to an owner or other employer who may or may not
have any interest in or be affected by the inspection.  That is
not what occurred in this case.

Insufficiency of Citation

	Employer also moved to dismiss the citation based upon the
following argument.  At the time of the prehearing conference in
this matter, the employer verbally challenged the validity of
the citation, taking the position that it failed to plead
appropriate language to support a willful violation.  The
Prehearing Conference Order indicated that with OR-OSHA becoming
aware of defendant's theory, OR-OSHA would move to amend its
citation.  OR-OSHA did not do so and chose to rely upon the
language of the citation as issued.  

	Employer moves to dismiss on two grounds, the first being that
OR-OSHA failed to comply with the Prehearing Conference Order by
not moving to file an amended citation.  The second argument is
that the citation itself fails to state sufficient facts to
support the willful violation allegation.

	At the time of hearing, I orally denied the motion to dismiss. 
My reasoning is as follows:  The Prehearing Conference Order
indicated that OR-OSHA desired to amend its citation and,
therefore, required that a motion be filed to accomplish that. 
OR-OSHA chose not to take that course and stood on the citation
as issued.  There is nothing in the Prehearing Conference Order
that indicates that OR-OSHA had to amend the citation or it
would face dismissal of the citation.  The Prehearing Conference
Order made no comment or finding as to the validity of the
citation as issued.  OR-OSHA was entitled to stand on the
validity of the citation as issued and there is no authority for
the proposition that its failure to amend the citation, as it
had originally indicated it would, constitutes a basis for
dismissing the citation.

	Beyond the procedural aspect of defendant's motion, the
substance of the motion is that the citation must allege facts
to support the violation classification as serious and to
establish the basis for employer knowledge.  The only authority
that employer offers for this proposition is ORS 654.071(2)(b)
which requires a plain statement of the facts upon which the
citation is based.  The citation in this case does contain a
statement of facts establishing the basis for the citation.  No
further formal pleading is required, either by the statute, the
rules of OR-OSHA, or the rules of the Workers' Compensation
Board.  Under the current rules, neither OR-OSHA nor the
employer are required to plead offenses or defenses with any
degree of specificity.  General notice-type pleading is allowed
and the citations issued in this case comply with that

Timeliness of Hearing

	Employer's final basis for its motion to dismiss is that the
Workers' Compensation Board failed to provide a timely hearing
under OAR 438-85-306 which provides that the Hearings Division,
once it receives a referral of a request for hearing, shall
schedule the case for formal hearing within 90 days of the

	The hearing in this case was set well after 90 days following
the date of referral to the Hearings Division.  There is nothing
in the rules or the statutes regarding Oregon safety cases that
provides that where a hearing is not held within that time
frame, the citation shall be dismissed.  Employer provides no
authority for the proposition.

	Employer alleges prejudice because of the late hearing date,
however, the employer made no effort to obtain an earlier
hearing date.  There was no claim of prejudice until the time of
hearing.  The only evidence of prejudice that I recall was one
statement from one witness from the employer that his memory
would have been better had the hearing occurred earlier.  On
that record, I do not find that the employer has established
prejudice as a result of the later hearing date.

Burden of Proof

	The Prehearing Conference Order required parties to brief the
issue of burden of proof with respect to employer's position
that the violations at issue in this case may have been the
result of isolated incidents of employee misconduct.  I am bound
by the Court of Appeals analysis in Skirvin v. APD, 32 Or App
109 (1978).  As the Court explains, employer knowledge is a
material element which must be established by OR-OSHA.  An
allegation of employee misconduct does not shift the burden to
the employer.  Employee misconduct is simply evidence that is
relevant to whether OR-OSHA has met its burden of proof. 
OR-OSHA must establish that the employer either knew or
reasonably can be charged with knowledge of a violation of a
safety rule.

	Employer knowledge, therefore, may be actual or constructive. 
Factors to be considered in determining whether isolated
employee misconduct means that the employer did not have
constructive knowledge include whether the employee action was 
taken despite a well-established work rule prohibiting the
conduct that was communicated to employees, trained and

La Pine Violation

	OR-OSHA has the burden of proving the existence of the fall
protection at La Pine.  The existence of the violation is
established by the testimony of OR-OSHA's compliance officer,
Claudia Marthaller, together with her contemporaneous written
notes compiled at or about the time of the inspection.  Based
upon her demeanor and manner while testifying, I found Ms.
Marthaller to be a credible witness and accept her version of
what she saw and heard at both La Pine and Sun River as accurate.

	When Ms. Marthaller arrived at La Pine, she saw workers for the
employer on top of the roof without fall protection.  There is
no dispute that the employees were not using fall protection,
that they were employees of the employer, and that one of the
employees, Mr. Nutter, was the foreman at the site.  I also find
from the testimony that the employer knew that it was required
to use fall protection when the ground to eave height was
greater than ten feet, that it did not use fall protection
initially at La Pine because there was so much snow that it was
felt to be unnecessary, but that fall protection equipment was
on site at the time of the inspection and it was anticipated
that that fall protection would be used once the snow melted
enough that fall protection use became necessary.

	Under OAR 437-03-040(1), fall protection is necessary when
workers are working on unguarded surfaces more than ten feet
above a lower level.  Under OAR 437-03-045(3), lower levels are
defined to include "ground levels, floors, ramps, runways,
excavations, pits, tanks, material, water, equipment and similar

	Employer argues that fall protection was not necessary because
there was snow on the ground measuring at least a foot and that,
therefore, the lower level was at nine feet, six inches.  Ms.
Marthaller did measure through some snow and obtained a ten
feet, six inch measurement.  She did not consider the snow to be
a different level because there was not enough snow to give

	I agree that it is arguable that under the administrative rule
defining lower levels, snow might constitute material. 
Therefore, if the evidence was that there was a level surface of
hard snow one or to feet above ground, therefore preventing a
fall of more than ten feet to a lower level, I would agree with
the employer that no violation was established.  However, that
is not the factual scenario presented in this case.  The
evidence in terms of testimony and particularly the photos at
exhibit 10 show that there was little snow remaining and that
what snow there was was not packed in a solid level fashion.  In
fact, there were a number of areas around the building that had
no snow at all.  OR-OSHA has the burden of proof on this issue. 
I find that the evidence establishes that there was not a lower
level of snow, but that the lower level was the ground surface
which was greater than ten feet.  

	Employer also argues that, with respect to both La Pine and Sun
River violations, fall protection was not necessary because
these were built up roofs and under OAR 437-03-075 where work is
being done on built up roofing work on low pitched roofs,
protection may be provided by using a safety monitoring system. 
I do not believe that the evidence indicates that such a safety
monitoring system was being utilized at either site.  However,
even if it was, it would not be sufficient.

	Built up roofing is defined at section 1926.502(p)(1) as

A weather-proofing cover, applied over roof decks, consisting of either a liquid applied system, a single-ply system, or a multiple-ply system. Liquid applied systems generally consist of silicone, rubber, plastics, or similar material applied by spray or roller equipment. Single-ply systems generally consist of a single layer of synthetic rubber, plastic or similar material, and a layer of adhesive. Multiple-ply systems generally consist of layers of felt and bitumen, and may be covered with a layer of mineral aggregate.
The roofs in question in this case were metal roofing. They do not meet the definition of built up roofing. Therefore, the safety monitoring system allowed for built up roofing does not apply. I would also note, with respect to the built up roofing argument, that it is inconsistent with the fact that at both La Pine and Sun River the employer had fall protection equipment on site and presumably intended to use it when it felt that it was necessary to do so. There is no indication that the employer intended to use a safety monitoring system or had the personnel on site trained for such a system. In terms of employer knowledge, OR-OSHA has met its burden. There is arguably actual employer knowledge because Mr. Nutter, one of the workers working without fall protection, was a foreman. In addition, in terms of constructive knowledge, I conclude that this employer should reasonably have known that fall protection was not being used as required. The employer had explicit knowledge of the need to use fall protection and the fact that its employees were not using fall protection. It had had a run of four citations for failure to use fall protection, and obviously the principals of the company were not happy with that history. Accordingly, the company fabricated fall protection equipment and made it available, along with training, to the employees. However, that was about as far as the employer went. Despite the prior history of problems with fall protection and the apparent reluctance of its employees to use fall protection even when instructed to do so, the employer did not follow up in terms of observation, enforcement and discipline in ensuring that fall protection was used. Despite the prior history and the knowledge that fall protection would be necessary at La Pine, Mr. Nutter, a foreman, and Mr. Long, the roofing manager, who periodically visited the site, did not monitor the ground to eave height to make sure the fall protection was used as soon as it became necessary. Mr. Damon testified that he told his employees that they had the equipment, the training and to use fall protection whenever there was any doubt as to whether it should be used. I am sure that Mr. Damon intended to send that message, but it was not being received by his employees. Despite the prior history and problems with fall protection, there was never any discipline more serious than a verbal reprimand given to any supervisor or employee as a result of the failure to use fall protection, and despite the prior history with fall protection, there was no explicit direction in the employee manual about the use of fall protection. Under those circumstances, I find that constructive knowledge has been established. The employer should have known that fall protection was not being used when it was necessary. Employer's final argument with respect to the La Pine citation is that the discretionary penalty is not supported. Under the administrative rules at OAR 437-01-135, et seq., the compliance officer rated the probability of an injury as low, which is reasonable. There was a low probability that someone would have been injured as a result of the lack of fall protection. She also rated the probability of injury as being serious physical harm, which again is reasonable. If a worker had fallen, it was certainly possible that the fall could have resulted in serious injury or broken limbs. Under OAR 437-01-165, this was a fourth repeat violation and, therefore, the penalty was at the discretion of the administrator, who could levy a fine of from $200 to $70,000 under subsection 2. Where the discretion is exercised properly under the administrative rules I am not in a position to substitute my judgment. See APD v. Asana, 110 Or App 103 (1991); OR-OSHA v. Affordable Roofing, Inc., 125 Or App 99 (1993); OR-OSHA v. Bellet Construction, 129 Or App 547 (1994). Employer argues that there is insufficient evidence that the director exercised his discretion in assessing the penalty in this case. The written record establishes that Ms. Marthaller prepared a narrative suggesting the basis for a $6,000 penalty. Her testimony establishes that that recommendation during the normal course would have gone to the administrator. There is evidence in the form of his initials that the administrator signed off upon the $6,000 penalty. The administrator also signs off on the citation which set forth the $6,000 penalty. Those facts are sufficient to establish that the administrator did act within his discretion in assessing the penalty in this case. I approve the citation as issued. Sun River Citation OR-OSHA has the burden of proving that a violation occurred. The fact that fall protection was necessary and was not being used does not appear to be in dispute. There was no snow on the ground in this case so those arguments regarding the applicable level are not applicable. The argument that this was built up roofing that did not require fall protection, but only required a safety monitoring system has already been dealt with. I reject that argument. I have also previously addressed the procedural arguments made by the employer with respect to the timing of or failure to provide credentials to the workers in this case. The fact of the violation is proved. In terms of employer knowledge, I find based upon the reasoning used with respect to the La Pine citation, that constructive knowledge has been established. In addition, the following factors provide an additional basis for that conclusion. By the time of the Sun River inspection, the La Pine inspection had occurred, although the citation arising from that inspection had not yet been issued. In any event, the employer had increased knowledge of its employee's failure to use fall protection. The only step taken by the employer to assure compliance was to call a company-wide meeting where Mr. Damon became quite angry with his employees for their failure to use fall protection. While the intentions were good, the message did not get across. Mr. Williams, when confronted at Sun River, indicated that he was not worried about fall protection and did not even know what the ground to eave height was. In addition, a manager, Mr. Long, was observed on the roof without fall protection. Again, the employer, at least in terms of its principles, made fall protection equipment and training available and wanted it to be used. However, given its knowledge of the fact that its employees were not using fall protection, the employer did not act reasonably in ensuring that the equipment was used. Assuming the existence of the violation, the employer argues that this should not have been cited as a willful violation. ORS 654.991(1) and OAR 437-01-015(53)(b)(A) define a willful violation as "a violation that is committed knowingly by an employer or supervisory employee who, having a free will or choice, intentionally or knowingly disobeys or recklessly disregards the requirements of a statute, regulation,. rule, standard or order. Employer argues that the violation of the fall protection requirements in Sun River was at best negligent and, therefore, cannot form the basis for a willful violation. I disagree. As fact finder, I am persuaded that the employer recklessly disregarded the requirements of the fall protection standard. As explained above, the employer's history establishes that it had explicit knowledge of fall protection requirements and that it had not complied with those requirements on numerous occasions. The employer also had knowledge that despite the efforts that it was making to ensure that fall protection was being utilized, those efforts were inadequate and that its employees, including foremen and other supervisors, were continuing to fail to use fall protection when it was required. Despite that knowledge, other than the company-wide meeting referred to above, the employer did essentially nothing new after La Pine and before Sun River to assure compliance with the fall protection requirements. I find that OR-OSHA has established reckless disregard for the regulation and, therefore, approve the citation. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that citation number M0072-062-93 in case number SH-93231 is approved. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that citation number M0072-075-93 in case number SH-93232 is approved. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES: You are entitled to judicial review of this Order. Proceedings for review are to be instituted by filing a petition in the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court Building, Salem, Oregon 97310, within 60 days following the date this Order is entered and served as shown hereon. The procedure for such judicial review is prescribed by ORS 183.480 and ORS 183.482. Entered at Portland, Oregon, November 27, 1995 Workers' Compensation Board John Mark Mills Administrative Law Judge