BEFORE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD



                            STATE OF OREGON



In the Matter of the Compensation	)  WCB Case No.  94-14511

					)  Claim No.  7804081E

					)  DOI:  01/04/93

					)  WCD File No. E767834

					)

		of			)  WCB Case No.  94-12207

					)  Claim No.  7197417L

					)  DOI:  06/13/94

					)  WCD File No. F763859

					)

DONNA E. TANNER, Claimant		)  ORDER ON REVIEW 



	Reviewed by Board Members Hall and Christian.



	The SAIF Corporation, on behalf of Kenton Station, requests
review of those portions of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Lipton's order that: (1) set aside its denial of claimant's
occupational disease claim for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome;
and (2) upheld SAIF/Yorgo's Tavern's denial of claimant's claim
for the same condition.  In her brief, claimant contests the
ALJ's $1,400 attorney fee award.  On review, the issues are
compensability, responsibility and attorney fees.  We affirm in
part and modify in part.



	We adopt and affirm that portion of the ALJ's order which found
SAIF (Kenton Station) responsible for claimant's bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome.  We add the following supplementation.



	The ALJ concluded that claimant had established compensability
of her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as an occupational
disease.  The ALJ further concluded that SAIF/Kenton Station was
responsible for that condition.  On review, SAIF/Kenton Station
argues that the ALJ erred in finding the opinion of claimant's
attending physician and surgeon, Dr. Van Allen, more persuasive
than the opinions of examining physicians, Radecki and White. 
We disagree. 



	We generally defer to the conclusions of a treating physician,
unless there are persuasive reasons to do otherwise.  Weiland v.
SAIF, 64 Or App 810, 814 (1983).  Here, we find no persuasive
reasons not to rely on the opinion of claimant's physician and
surgeon, Dr. Van Allen.  Accordingly, on this basis, we agree
with the ALJ that claimant has established compensability of her
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.1



	
1 Because of our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary to address claimant's argument that ORS 656.005(24) is contrary to, and preempted by, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Claimant seeks an increase in the $1,400 attorney fee awarded by the ALJ. Based on the following reasoning, we modify the ALJ's attorney fee award. OAR 438-015-0010(4) sets out the following factors to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney fee: (a) the time devoted to the case; (b) the complexity of the issue(s) involved; (c) the value of the interest involved; (d) the skill of the attorneys; (e) the nature of the proceedings; (f) the benefit secured for the represented party; (g) the risk in a particular case that an attorney's efforts may go uncompensated; and (h) the assertion of frivolous issues or defenses. Our review of the record reveals the following information. The hearing regarding the carrier's denials lasted approximately three hours and claimant called one witness. Claimant's attorney obtained a medical report from Dr. Van Allen which supported claimant's claim. Claimant's attorney submitted no statement of services regarding the amount of time spent on the case. The legal, factual and medical issues involved in the case were of a complexity level not unlike those generally presented for ALJ/Board resolution. The value of the compensability issue is substantial in that claimant required surgery. Likewise, the benefit secured is significant in that claimant's medical bills will be paid and she will be compensated for any disability related to her compensable condition. Finally, with a risk of going uncompensated for such services, claimant's counsel persuasively and successfully advocated claimant's position at hearing, resulting in a beneficial result. After conducting our review, and considering the factors set forth in the aforementioned rule, we find that a reasonable attorney fee for claimant's counsel's services at the hearing level is $2,500, to be paid by SAIF/Kenton Station.2 In reaching this conclusion, we have particularly considered the complexity of the denial issue, the time devoted to the issue (as represented by the hearing record), the nature of the proceedings, the benefit secured for claimant, and the risk that claimant's counsel might go uncompensated.
2 As explained in his dissenting opinion in Paul R. Huddleston, 48 Van Natta 4 (1996), considering an ALJ's close proximity to the litigants and their counsel, Chair Hall refrains from second-guessing an ALJ's attorney fee award absent compelling reasons. Here, he finds those compelling reasons. His reasons for this conclusion are as follows. In setting a reasonable attorney fee award, the court has instructed the Board to consider the factors prescribed in OAR 438-015-0010(4) and provide an explanation for our award that is "detailed enough to inform [the court] that [we] considered all of the factors and had a reasonable basis for the award." Higgins v. Schramm Plastics, 112 Or App 563 (1992). As the reviewing body for ALJ's orders, he submits that the Board can ask no less from the ALJ. In this particular case, the ALJ's order merely states that claimant's $1,400 award has been granted"[p]ursuant to OAR 438-15-010(4)." Lacking an explanation which is sufficiently detailed to determine that the factors of the rule have been considered and that there is a reasonable basis for the attorney fee award, Chair Hall concludes that there is a compelling reason to examine claimant's attorney fee award. Moreover, for the reasons expressed in this decision, he finds that the ALJ's determination of a reasonable award was inadequate.
Finally, claimant's attorney is also entitled to an attorney fee award for services on review. ORS 656.382(2). After considering the factors set forth in OAR 438-015-0010(4) and applying them to this case, we find that a reasonable fee for claimant's attorney's services on review regarding the denial issue is $1,750, payable by SAIF, on behalf of Kenton Station. In reaching this conclusion, we have particularly considered the time devoted to the issue (as represented by claimant's attorney's statement of services, including SAIF's objections), the complexity of the issue, and the value of the interest involved. In determining a fee, we have not considered claimant's counsel's services in defending the ALJ's attorney fee award. See Saxton v. SAIF, 80 Or App 631 (1986). ORDER The ALJ's order dated June 23, 1995 is affirmed in part and modified in part. In lieu of the ALJ's attorney fee award, claimant's counsel is awarded $2,500, to be paid by SAIF/Kenton Station. The remainder of the ALJ's order is affirmed. For services on review, claimant's attorney is awarded $1,750, payable by SAIF on behalf of Kenton Station. Notice to all Parties: This order is final unless, within 30 days after the date of mailing of copies of this order to the parties, one of the parties appeals to the Court of Appeals at the Supreme Court Building, Salem, Oregon 97310 for judicial review as provided by ORS 656.298. Copies of any such appeal shall be mailed by registered or certified mail to the Board and all other parties to this review proceeding with a proof of such service filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals. Entered at Salem, Oregon on June 18, 1996 Workers' Compensation Board Nelson R. Hall, Board Chair G. Marie Christian, Board Member